The U.S. economy has experienced a reduction in volatility since the mid 1980's. In this paper we investigate the changes in the response of the economy to an oil price shock and the role of the systematic monetary policy response in accounting for changes in the response of output, prices, inventories, sales and the overall decline in volatility. Our results suggest a smaller and more short-lived response of most macro variables during the Volcker-Greenspan period. It also appears that while the systematic monetary policy response has dampened fluctuations in economic activity during the 1970s, it has had virtually no effect after the 'Great Moderation'.
Introduction
To policy makers, oil price shocks pose the difficult challenge of balancing the trade-off between higher inflation and higher unemployment. Work by Watson (1997, 2004) suggests that monetary policy makers have historically leaned towards keeping inflation at bay, at the cost of a greater slowdown in economic activity. That is to say, the systematic component of monetary policy accounted for a large portion of the decline in GDP growth following an oil price shock. Although the magnitude of this systematic component is a matter of debate (see Herrera, 2004 and Watson, 2004) , the current investigation into the sources of the 'Great Moderation' suggests two questions that call for further analysis. One is whether changes in the dynamic response of the economy to observable shocks, such as an oil price increase, can account for the decline in volatility. The second question is the role of systematic monetary policy in accounting for changes in the response of output, prices, inventories and sales to these shocks. The aim of this paper is to address these issues and to examine the contribution of better monetary policy and oil price shocks to the widespread decline in volatility.
Since Kim and Nelson (1999) In this paper we address the contribution of "better policy" and "good luck" from a different perspective.
Using a modified VAR system, in the spirit of Sims and Zha (2006) , we ask whether the reaction of monetary policy to a specific shock (oil prices) contributed to the 'Great Moderation'. Although other types of shocks (e.g., fiscal or technology shocks) constitute an interesting research area, we focus on oil price shocks for two reasons.
First, oil price increases have been put forward as a possible cause for the increased volatility of the U.S. economy during the 1970s, especially for the heightened inflation and the decline in output growth (Hamilton, 1983) . Second, periods of oil price increases are somewhat easier to identify than other structural shocks. Since, as emphasized by Barsky and Kilian (2002) , Parkin (1993) , Ireland, (1999) , and Orphanides (2002) among others, monetary policy is another possible explanation for the changes in the behavior or macroeconomic variables, we focus our attention to the contribution of the monetary policy response to oil price shocks and its role in the 'Great Moderation'.
We find that the magnitude and the duration of the response of output, and especially prices, to an oil price shock has diminished during the Volcker-Greenspan era. Of interest is the significantly smaller contribution of systematic monetary policy to the dynamic response of most macro variables during the post-1984 period. We estimate that a one-year delay in the systematic monetary policy response would have lowered the variance of GDP growth by 27% and 8% in the pre-1980 period and post-1984 periods. Regarding manufacturing, our estimation results suggest a somewhat smaller and shorter-lived response to oil price shocks during the post-1984 years. After the 'Great Moderation', a one-year delay in the monetary policy response would have resulted in a slight reduction in the volatility of sales and work-in-process inventories and roughly no effect on the volatility of finished goods and materials and supplies inventories.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the recent literature on the debate between the proponents of the good luck hypothesis and better policy hypotheses, sections 3 and 4 describe the industry level data and the VAR specification used; section 5 addresses the effect of oil price shocks and systematic monetary policy, and the last section provides some concluding remarks.
Good Luck and Better Policy
The proponents of the "good luck" hypothesis have argued that a reduction in the size of the shocks hitting the economy have accounted for a large proportion of the decline in U.S. output volatility. Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2004) identify smaller shocks with a reduction in the high frequency range of the spectrum of GDP growth, and monetary policy with the business cycle frequencies. They find that most of the reduction in the volatility of output can be explained by a reduction in the size of the innovations (i.e. a smaller contribution of the high frequency range). However, they recognize that this behavior can also be consistent with "better monetary policy" that has acted to eliminate sun spot equilibria. Similarly, Stock and Watson (2002) find some role both for identifiable shocks -less volatile money, commodity prices, and productivity shocks-, and improved monetary policy in the decline of U.S. output growth volatility. However, they conclude that "to the extent that improved policy gets some of the credit, then one can expect at least some of the moderation to continue as long as the policy regime is maintained. But because most of the reduction seems to be due to good luck in the form of smaller economic disturbances, we are left with the unsettling conclusion that the quiescence of the past fifteen years could well be a hiatus before a return to more turbulent economic times."
The idea that monetary policy can be a major source of business cycle fluctuations is by no means new.
In fact, a large body of literature in macroeconomics and monetary economics has been devoted to obtaining plausible measures of the contribution of monetary policy to business cycle fluctuations. One one hand the VAR literature has provided important insights into the effect of unanticipated monetary policy shocks (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans, 1999 ) reaching a broad consensus that they account for only a small proportion of the volatility of aggregate output and even less of the fluctuations in the aggregate price level.
On the other hand works that do not distinguish between the anticipated and unanticipated components suggest monetary policy plays an important role in explaining business cycle fluctuations (Romer and Romer, 1989 ). Thus, it seems reasonable that if we want to investigate the role of monetary policy on the 'Great Moderation' we should concentrate our attention to its systematic component.
To be able to compare the systematic monetary policy component before and after the decline in volatility, we need to pick a macroeconomic shock to which monetary policy is likely to respond. As we mentioned in the introduction, we focus on oil price shocks for two reasons. First, oil price shocks have been put forward as a possible explanation for the increased inflation and the recessions of the 1970s. Second, periods of oil price shocks are somewhat easier to identify than other structural shocks of interest, such as technology shocks. Certainly, focusing on the role of oil prices has also some disadvantage. As Table 1 illustrates, whereas the volatility of the real oil price experienced a significant increase 1 , the volatility of output growth and inflation declined (76% and 89%, respectively). Similar declining patterns are observed for manufacturing sales and inventories at different stages of production, especially for inventories of materials and supplies where volatility declined by 75%. Hence, some "good luck" must have taken the form of smaller shocks (other than oil prices) not analyzed in this paper (e.g., technology shocks). It is also conceivable that the response of monetary policy to other shocks hitting the economy differed between the pre-Volcker and the Volcker-Greenspan-Bernanke periods. For instance, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) find evidence that the monetary policy rule during the Volcker-Greenspan era was more effective in terms of mitigating the effect of any shock and in stabilizing changes in expected inflation. To the extent that this result is likely to hold for an extended sample including the last Greenspan years and the beginning of the Bernanke period, "better policy" in response to shocks, other than oil prices, may have played an important role in the 'Great Moderation'. Although beyond the scope of this paper, exploring the role of other shocks -possibly using similar tools to those employed in this paper-may shed additional light on the "good luck" or "better policy"
controversy.
All in all, our aim is first to establish the contribution of oil price shocks to the variance of GDP, inflation, manufacturing sales and inventories across subsamples, and, second, to evaluate whether the role of monetary policy in moderating the effect of this shock varied between the pre-Volcker and the Volcker-Greenspan era.
Finally, we investigate whether the response of monetary policy accounts for the reduction in the volatility of other series such as manufacturing sales and inventories. We estimate a quarterly structural VAR describing the behavior of the vector y t , which contains three blocks of variables. The first block includes the following macroeconomic variables: the log growth of potential output (y N ), the log growth of GDP (y GDP t ), the log of the GDP deflator (y P,t ), and the log growth of real oil prices (y OIL,t ). The following block contains the federal funds rate (ff ,t ), our indicator of monetary policy. The last block is an industry block, which includes sales (y S,t ) and inventories by stages of production (finished goods, y F It , work-in-process, y W It , and materials y MI,t ). We assume that the structural VAR for y t has a linear moving average representation
Econometric Specification
where B (L) is an infinite order matrix lag polynomial, and
0 is a vector of white noise structural innovations. We identify the response function B (L) and the structural disturbances u t by placing restrictions on certain elements of B 0 . The restrictions are given by
The identification restrictions in (2) are common in the VAR literature on the effects of monetary policy.
Ordering the federal funds rate last in the macro block follows the conventional assumption that monetary policy cannot instantaneously affect potential output growth, output growth, prices and oil prices.
Note that our specification of the macro block differs from that of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (2004) and Hamilton and Herrera (2004) , in that we include a measure of potential output and we exclude the commodity price index. As noted by Giordani (2006) among others, the traditional approach of including commodity prices in the VAR is not enough to avoid the price puzzle, particularly in the second period of our sample. Following his suggestion, we include the log growth of potential output in the VAR before the log growth of GDP. (See also Giordani (2006) page 26 and 27). In addition, instead of measuring oil prices by the net oil price increase, we use the growth rate of real oil prices. 3 The ordering of the real oil price growth after the macroeconomic variables and before the federal funds rate imposes the reasonable restriction that the oil price does not contemporaneously affect output growth and prices, while it contemporaneously affects the monetary policy equation. Some authors have argued that -at least until the late 1990's-major oil price shocks were caused by political disruptions in the Middle
East that were exogenous to the U.S. economy (Hamilton, 1983 (Hamilton, , 1996 ; Bernanke, Gertler and Watson, 1997).
However, others have argued that since 1973 -when the Middle East countries became the dominant supplier of crude petroleum-oil prices have become increasingly responsive to demand conditions (Barsky and Kilian, 2002 ; Kilian, 2005 and . In this paper we deal with the endogeneity of oil prices by treating them as predetermined with respect to the federal funds rate. That is, we assume no contemporaneous feedback from monetary policy to oil prices. While we cannot test this assumption, we can show that the correlation between the VAR innovations to the oil price measure and to the federal funds rate is rather low (less than 0.001).
The restrictions in (2) suffice to identify the effect of oil price shocks and the systematic monetary policy response on the industry block. However, because we do not attempt to attain identification at the interior of the industry block (i.e. sales, finished goods, work-in-process, and materials and supplies inventories), no restrictions are imposed on the off-diagonal elements of B 0 corresponding to the industry equations. 4 In addition, we impose the following restrictions on the elements of B (L)
where b i,j (l) denotes the i, j element at lag l of B (L). Under the restrictions (2) and (3) the industry specific variables are constrained to affect the macro variables only indirectly through their effect on the aggregate economy. Thus, our estimated VARs can be described as a near-VAR specification that guarantees that the effects of oil price and monetary policy shocks, as well as the other unspecified macro shocks, are identical across manufacturing aggregates. Thus, even though we estimate separate VARs for durable and nondurable manufactures, the implied effects of the shocks of interest on the macro variables are identical. At the same time this specification allows the response of sales and inventories to vary freely across durable and nondurable manufacturing goods.
Data
In this paper we use quarterly data, in the spirit of Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (2004), instead of the monthly data used by Hamilton and Herrera (2004) and Bernanke, Gertler and Watson (1997) . In this manner we are able to include 4-quarterly lags in our VAR specification, which is consistent with previous literature on the effect of oil price shocks (see for instance Hamilton, 1983; Mork, 1989; Raymond and Rich, 1997, and Hamilton, 2003) , and reduce the number of parameters to be estimated relative to the monthly model. This is of particular relevance given that we split the sample in two smaller subperiods. In addition, using quarterly data allows us to make our results comparable to previous literature on output volatility.
The data comprise both macroeconomic variables and industry level series from the first quarter of 1959
to the fourth quarter of 2006. As we mentioned before, the macroeconomic variables include the log growth of potential output, the log growth of real GDP, the log of the GDP deflator, the log growth of the real decomposition. We will then assume lower triangularity of B 0 also for the industry block.
oil price, and the federal funds rate. Data for real GDP, the GDP deflator and the federal funds rate were obtained from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We follow Giordani (2006) and compute potential output as [log(GDP ) − capacity * 0.5/100], where capacity is the series of capacity utilization for manufacturing (SIC) computed by the Federal Reserve Board. The real oil price is computed by deflating the Refiners Acquisition Cost for composite crude oil (reported by the Department of Energy)
by the Consumer Price Index.
One may argue, however, that the measure of oil price shock should be based on a non-linear transformation of the nominal oil price rather than on the real price, as it is sometimes done in the related literature At the industry level we use sales and inventories series for total manufacturing, as well as nondurable and durable manufacturing goods from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The inventory data are disaggregated by stages of production into materials, work-in-process and finished goods inventories. The data are seasonally adjusted and measured in chained dollars of 1996. The original series are available at a monthly frequency, and we transform them into quarterly data by aggregating monthly sales and using end of quarter inventories.
VAR Analysis
As initially documented by Kim and Nelson (1999) 6 We have two reasons to split the sample at those particular dates. First, because we want to study whether the economy's response to an oil price shock has changed, we need to eliminate the period in which the structural break is possibly located. Second, this particular split eliminates the nonborrowed reserve targeting experiment from the second sample (see also Boivin and Giannoni, 2005 ). The exclusion of the possible break provides the additional advantage of not having to model a structural break in the variance covariance matrix during the estimation of our VAR.
For each manufacturing aggregate we estimate the nine equations in (1) 
Impulse Response Analysis
To study changes in the dynamic response to oil price shocks we calculate the effect of an exogenous 10% increase in the real oil price for both the entire sample and the split samples. We compute confidence intervals robust to possible presence of conditional heteroskedasticity using a recursive design wild bootstrap, as suggested by Gonçalves and Kilian (2004) . We either report the corresponding 68% and 95% confidence bands or we use symbols on the response function to denote points in the impulse response that are statistically significant.
Oil Price Shocks
The left panel of Figure 2 plots usual response functions for the entire sample. That is, the total effect which combines the direct effect of an oil price increase plus the indirect effect through the systematic monetary policy response. As previously reported in the literature, an unexpected increase in the price of crude oil results in a slowdown in economic activity about four quarters after the shock. The VAR also predicts a tighter monetary policy reflected in an increase in the federal funds rate, possibly aimed at curbing inflation.
In Figure 3 we plot the responses for the two subsamples period.
An interesting result is the change in the response of prices across subsamples. Note that in the preVolcker era the oil price shock generates an increase in the price level and a slowdown in output growth. 8 During the second period, the shock still generates a slowdown in GDP growth but the increase in prices is considerably smaller. Although the responses of the price level are not precisely estimated, the change in the magnitude suggests that the less accommodative monetary policy of the Volcker-Greenspan era may has been more effective in controlling the expectations of higher inflation that follow an oil price shock. The disaggregated results ( Figures 5 and 6 ) suggests that the dampening of the sales' response took place both for the nondurable and the durables industries. For instance, the cumulative effect on non durables (durables) reaches a trough at -1.1% (-1.9%) in the first period and at -0.1% (-0.4%) in the second period.
In contrast, the change in the behavior of inventories is mostly limited to durable manufactures, and to some degree in durables inventories of materials and supplies. These patterns in the response of inventories suggest that better inventory holding techniques could have contributed to the smoother and faster adjustment of input inventories to oil price shocks. However, the smoother response of sales may also be consistent with a structural break in the data generating process for sales as posited by Ramey and Vine (2004).
Systematic Monetary Policy
Is this change in the dynamics a result of a shift in the monetary policy rule? To address this issue we , the counterfactual scenario we analyze is one in which exogenous monetary policy is aimed at maintaining the federal funds rate unchanged for one year in face of an oil price shock. We interpret this scenario as the direct response obtained by shutting down the (indirect) response of systematic monetary policy. We calculate the consequences of this policy by computing the value of u F ED,t+s that would keep the value of y F ED,t+s at zero for four quarters, and add this shock in at horizons s = 1, 2, 3, 4 before calculating the response of the industry block to the oil price shock.
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It seems plausible that if the deviation of the monetary policy from the expected path is not large and purely transitory (we impose it to last only for one year) agents should not be able to react immediately and significantly affect the structure of the economy thus protecting our exercise from the Lucas critique. 
Historical decomposition
As Kilian (2005) shocks we compute the historical decomposition of the shocks to the real oil price on the aggregate and manufacturing variables. As in the previous sections, we split the sample in two periods and compute the cumulative effect using the VAR estimates for the sub-sample under analysis. Figures 7-10 
Volatility and Variance Decomposition
The impulse responses (Figures 3-6 ) and the historical decomposition (Figures 7-10 ) evidence two important changes in the role played by oil price shocks and systematic monetary policy in explaining economic fluctuations. First, since the 'Great Moderation', oil price shocks account for a smaller proportion of the variability of both macro and manufacturing variables. Second, anticipated monetary policy played a smaller role in dampening fluctuations in real economic activity during the Volcker-Greenspan period.
Because our main interest is in understanding the reduction in the variance since 1980s, we now estimate some measures of volatility from the mean square error of the 30 periods-ahead forecast, and of the contribution of the oil price shock to the mean square error (MSE) of our variables as implied by our estimated VAR.
Given that the mean square error at a long horizon can be interpreted an approximation of the unconditional variance, the variance decomposition provides an estimate of the contribution of oil prices to the volatility of each variable in the system. By comparing the MSE across sub-samples we can assess changes in volatility while, by comparing the MSE across alternative scenarios (i.e., with and without systematic response) but within the same period, we can assess the role of monetary policy.
To compute the variance of the industry block we now need to identify the VAR completely, thus we impose the following causal ordering for the industry data: sales, finished goods, work-in-process and material and supplies. As in the previous section we report our estimates for the two periods under consideration with and without a systematic response of the monetary policy. Table 2 reports the variance of each variable as estimated from the parameters of the VAR. 13 The first three columns of the table report the results from the standard structural VAR for the entire sample and the two subsamples under consideration. 14 The last three columns report the decomposition when we shut down the systematic monetary policy response for one year.
As documented in the literature almost all the variables show a significant drop in the unconditional 13 We report the estimated variance multiplied by 100 for all variables except oil and federal funds rates. 14 Given the short time span and the large dimension of the VAR the estimated variance in the two subsamples should be taken with caution due to large uncertainty. Changes in the role of monetary policy can also be observed in the disaggregate data. Declines in volatility are evident for sales and work-in-process inventories. The only exceptions are finished goods and materials and supplies inventories for which the variance either remains unchanged or slightly increases. It is interesting that materials and supplies, which show the largest percentage decline in the variance across the two sub-samples, is also the group that is less affected by the systematic monetary policy. Differences in the behavior of materials and supplies and work-in-process inventories suggest that: improvements in inventory holding techniques may have influenced both types of input inventories in a similar manner, but fluctuations in interest rates linked to changes in the systematic monetary policy response may have affected the purchase and usage of input inventories differently. 16 For each variable in the VAR, table 3 reports the percent of the total variance after 7 1/2 years due to an oil price shock. The results for the full sample show that the contribution of an oil price shock to the variability of GDP is around 3.7%. When we don't allow the policy maker to systematically respond, the oil price shock contributes 1.2% of the total variance. The contribution to the variance of prices is around 0.02% in both scenarios.
Looking at total manufacturing, the larger differences in the contribution of the oil price shock (with and without systematic response) can be found in sales and work-in-process inventories for which the contribution is almost half the size. Given that the unconditional variance (the denominator in the variance decomposition) of the macro series does not vary across policy scenarios, we can conclude that what changed was the response of the variables to the oil price shock.
Splitting the sample in the two periods also reveals some interesting results. For the macro variables, the systematic response lowers the contribution of oil prices in the first period but leaves it almost unchanged in the second. In the pre-Volcker period the contribution of the oil price shock to the variance of GDP is 23.52% and 34.85% with and without systematic monetary policy response, respectively. That is, about 32% of the contribution is explained by the by the systematic response ( 11.33 percentage points of the 37.85%). The systematic monetary policy response contributed to a lesser role of the oil price shocks in the variance of federal funds rate, some of which is accounted for by the smaller overall variance ( Table   2 ). Regarding the manufacturing series, the contribution of the oil price shock to the variance of sales and inventories is higher when we only consider the pre-Volcker period. When we delay the monetary policy response, the variance decomposition almost doubles for sales and is five times higher for total and durables work-in-process inventories.
On the whole, the data suggests that the impact of the systematic monetary policy in mitigating the effect of an oil price shock is much smaller after the 'Great Moderation'. The only case in which it still has a marginal effect is in sales and durables inventories.
Finally, Table 4 reports the percent of the variance reduction explained by better monetary policy, good luck, and oil price shocks. To compute these participations, here we follow a method similar to Stock and Watson (2002) . That is, we consider the baseline variance estimated from the post-1984 VARs and compute the counterfactual by replacing the policy equation or the variance of the structural shocks by their pre-1980 values. Better monetary policy explains a significant proportion of the decline in the variance of output growth (28.65%) and the price level (49.12%), whereas the proportion explained by good luck is an order of magnitude larger. Yet, good luck seems to have taken a form other than smaller oil price shocks. Note that the contribution of oil prices is minimal. A similar pattern is observed for the manufacturing variables where the ratio of the variance reduction explained by good luck relative to that explained by better policy ranges from 1/3 to 9, and oil price shocks marginally increase the variance.
Final Remarks
In this paper we analyze the contribution of oil prices shocks and systematic monetary policy to the 'Great Moderation'. We find that a one-time 10% increase in the real oil prices had a larger and longer-lived effect on output growth, the aggregate price level, manufacturing sales' growth and inventory investment in the pre-Volcker period. In addition, the historical decomposition suggests an important contribution of oil prices to economic fluctuations, particularly during the years following the Arab-Israel War and the Persian Gulf War. The contribution declined in the late 1990s, but appears to have increased somewhat during 2006.
Regarding the role of the systematic monetary policy response, it appears to have dampened fluctuations in economic activity during the 1970s, but to have had virtually no effect after the 'Great Moderation'.
The impulse responses indicate that preventing a change in the fed funds rate (in response to the oil price increase) would have resulted in a lower price level and a milder recession during the pre-Volcker period.
Similarly, this counterfactual scenario results in larger contribution of oil price shocks to the variance of GDP growth, inflation and manufacturing sales and work-in-process inventories. These results are also supported 
